Since LTCG is enabled now, we don't have to define every function inside
the headers for ~xXx super speed xXx~, which means we can strip the
headers down to their bare minimum and reduce interdependencies and
therefore recompilation times by a lot.
In the long term, there is no reason DirectExec should be concerned with
C4AulScript/C4ScriptHost. In the meantime, the lookup code from Fneval can
be moved into the function.
This allows eval in scenario script to access scenario script locals, but
that seems harmless.
* Show max one message per second per client
* Do not show ready message locally
* Fix observer flag reset by ready state change
* Reflect ready state change in client list immediately
The C++ standard library comes with perfectly fine implementations of
these functions, so there's no point in reimplementing them just for the
hell of it.
When moving attached objects, it will now move the attachment target along with the object. This makes moving elevator cases and wind generators a lot easier.
As discussed in http://forum.openclonk.org/topic_show.pl?tid=2917, I
have merged all copyright notices into a single file and referenced that
merged file from each source file.
For the updated source files, the timeline has been split into three
parts:
1. Pre-RWD code (before 2001)
2. RWD code (2001 through 2009)
3. OpenClonk code (2009 and later)
All pre-RWD copyright notices have been left intact, as have RWD-era
copyright notices where the file did not have a RedWolf design copyright
notice but only individual author ones. All copyright notices of the
OpenClonk era have been replaced by a single notice ranging from the
first recorded year to the current year (2013). Mape code did not get a
OpenClonk Team copyright notice because it is somewhat separate from the
main OpenClonk codebase and has only been touched by Armin Burgmeier.
Sending handles might desync network games if one of the connected
engines had run a different scenario before the current one, since ID
handles aren't cleared between games.
fInternal basically acted as a reverse "evil bit" as in RFC 3514: when
set, the engine would not do any checks on the script contained in the
control packet, nor log the script (visibly in game; the packet log
would of course contain the packet). A malicious game client thus would
be able to inject arbitrary script without people (immediately) noticing
anything was amiss.
As of this patch, only the host is able to execute arbitrary scripts,
and those will be shown in the message board for all players to see.
This privilege can be irrevocably disabled in network games by any
client by using the "/nodebug" message board command.
Closes#936.
Actions changed include dropping definitions, (de-)selecting objects,
player elimination. This removes some more pre-assembled C4Script code
going across the network unchecked.
Part of #936.
Instead of sending pre-composed C4Script code across the network, make
player self-management (surrendering, team changes etc.) send a
dedicated control packet. This means less network traffic, and also a
smaller attack vector for malicions C4Script injection.
Part of #936.
MsgBoard commands used to be evaluated on the issuing client. Malicious
clients would be able to insert arbitrary C4Script code to be executed
instead of the scenario-defined command; other clients would not be able
to tell the difference.
Instead, we now only send the command identifier, issuing player and
command parameter. This is still not perfect because clients can
insert any player they want, but it's better than before.
Part of #936.
Rotation was still stored as an integer and as a fixed point number.
Compute the integer on demand from the fixed point instead, like the
position. Rewrite the movement code where the two variables were
temporarily out of sync.
Nicolas Hake